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Towards a framework for resolving 
the justice and reconciliation  
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Abstract
Zimbabwe has never had meaningful and comprehensive programmes 
to provide justice in the many issues that cascade from conf lict and 
violence in the nation. What has been done, amounts to armistices rather 
than transitional justice mechanisms. Consequently, Zimbabwe has not 
seriously dealt with the primary sources of conf lict and violence that date 
back to colonial times. The rhetoric of unity premised on amnesia has been 
privileged over effective practical healing and reconciliation mechanisms 
that address the root causes of recurrent human rights violations. Indemnities, 
amnesties and presidential pardons have been used to protect perpetrators 
of conf lict and violence. This article attempts to explore key issues and 
challenges around the healing and reconciliation question by exposing the 
contending perspectives and issues provoked by the adoption of the new 
constitution in Zimbabwe and the setting up of the National Peace and 
Reconciliation Commission (NPRC). Theoretically, the article posits that 
the very logic that informs the construction of ‘the political’ (as a domain 
of political values and incubator of political practices), which privileges 
notions of ‘the will to power’ and the ‘paradigm of war’, makes conf lict and 
violence to be accepted as normal. Practically, the article advances ideas 
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of ‘survivor’s justice’ as opposed to the traditional ‘criminal justice’ that 
fragments a society emerging from a catalogue of conf licts and violence into 
simplistic ‘perpetrator’ and ‘victim’ binaries. Survivor’s justice privileges 
political reform as a long-lasting solution involving reconstitution of ‘the 
political’ itself. 
Keywords: healing and reconciliation, Zimbabwe, ‘the political’, human 
rights abuses, National Peace and Reconciliation Commission.
1. Introduction
The new interest in the resolution of conf lict issues and the norming of 
national healing as a paradigm for government action emerges within a 
context in which Zimbabwe adopted a new constitution in 2013 which 
mandates the government to set up a National Peace and Reconciliation 
Commission (NPRC). This new constitution and commission are 
taking place in a country where the very constitution of ‘the political’ 
has been underpinned by a perennial ‘paradigm of war’ that is 
articulated in terms of a series of Zvimurenga (First Chimurenga, Second 
Chimurenga, and Third Chimurenga) and is therefore refusing to die. 
This paradigm of war has inscribed conf licts and violence. It has created 
unending cycles for perpetrators and victims in which victims become 
perpetrators in one episode of violence and perpetrators become victims 
in the next. Under these circumstances, peace, justice and reconciliation 
inevitably remain elusive and the work of the National Peace and 
Reconciliation Commission is bound to be a daunting task. Under these 
circumstances, ordinary Zimbabweans continue to cry out for a new 
paradigm of peace, justice and reconciliation. 
This article proposes the reconstitution of ‘the political’ in Zimbabwe as 
a turning point towards a pursuit of healing and reconciliation mainly 
because a ‘paradigm of war’ exists as central Leitmotif of political practice. 
Chantal Mouffe (2005:8) defined ‘the political’ as the domain of values, 
norms and ‘ontological’ issues, which lie at the very base of the constitution 
of society. 
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She understood ‘politics’ as made up of the empirical practices of power 
and visible ‘institutions through which an order is created, organizing 
human coexistence in the context of conf lictuality provided by the 
political’ (Mouffe 2005: 9).  The article posits that these unhelpful values 
are etched at the very centre of ‘the political’, then to break out of them, 
there is need to take advantage of the adoption of the new constitution and 
get follow-up work by the NRPC to predicate their work on the principles 
of what Mahmood Mamdani (2015) terms ‘survivor’s justice’. Survivor’s 
justice gestures towards reconstitution of ‘the political’ (political reform), 
rather than the traditional post-1945 Nuremberg-criminal justice with 
its propensity to fragment a people emerging from mass violence into 
‘perpetrators’ and ‘victims’. In survivor’s justice, people emerging from 
conf lict are collectively understood as survivors who are crying out for 
a new society, underpinned by a new ‘political’ capable of producing a 
new humanity. 
What must be backgrounded is that cross pre-colonial, colonial and 
post-colonial historical interludes, Zimbabwe has experienced recurrent 
conf licts on a protracted basis (Benyera 2014a:3). These violent episodes 
were given various names, such as: inter-communal raiding in the pre-
colonial era, pacification of primitive and barbarous tribes during the 
colonial encounters and Chimurenga during the nationalist liberation 
struggle. The arrival of the Ndebele-speaking people in 1838 is often 
blamed for bringing Mfecane-like violence into the space between the 
Zambezi and Limpopo rivers. But this type of argument ignores the fact 
that those people whom the Ndebele found in Zimbabwe also raided 
each other. The Ndebele-speaking people seem to have used a mode of 
fighting which made their raiding more successful than that of other pre- 
colonial people.
The advent of colonialism exacerbated conf licts and violence. Colonial 
encroachment and rule provoked not only the Anglo-Ndebele War of 1893, 
the Ndebele-Shona Uprising (1896–1897, otherwise known as the First 
Chimurenga/Primary Resistance), but also the Second Chimurenga (War 
of Independence, 1960–1980). The nationalist struggle was also a theatre 
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of violence as settler colonial intransigence and brutality provoked African 
nationalist counter-violence – with far-reaching implications for human 
rights issues. At the centre of the conf lict was not only the racial question, 
but also the ethnic question which was subordinated to the nationalist 
rhetoric. The nationalist liberation was seriously affected by what Masipula 
Sithole (1979:vii) termed ‘struggles within the struggle’. In the process of 
liberating the country, the liberation struggle succeeded in politicising 
identities while failing to create a common national patriotism, a challenge 
which continues to haunt Zimbabwe to date. 
The negotiations at Lancaster House in London in 1979 became an armistice 
for 30 years (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a). In the first place, the land question, 
which was among the cardinal anti-colonial historic grievances that caused 
the nationalist liberation struggle, was not resolved at Lancaster (Bakare 
1993). The negotiations were dominated by debates over the future of the 
white minority settlers and their economic privileges. White economic 
privileges were to be guaranteed in exchange for majority rule. Ethnic 
questions were not raised as the Zimbabwe African Patriotic Union (ZAPU) 
and the Zimbabwe African Nation Union (ZANU) pretended to be a united 
Patriotic Front (PF), only to fragment prior to the elections of 1980 into 
hostile and contending political formations. 
Zimbabwe came into being as a product of a protracted armed liberation 
struggle that spanned over 15 years. Zimbabwe’s history has a complicated 
pre-colonial genealogy and a complex experience of colonial brutality, 
leaving memories of repressive and violent cultures (Mlambo 2009:105). 
White settler colonialism was introduced through violence and was 
maintained through domination, repression and exploitation. Taken 
together, these processes and experiences bequeathed to Zimbabwe huge 
tasks of justice and reconciliation. It is therefore logical to take into 
account where Zimbabwe is coming from as we think about the prospects 
of a justice and reconciliation framework.
Consequently, Zimbabwe was born in 1980 with a very bad birth mark and 
subject to serious suspicions cascading from the liberation with far-reaching 
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consequences for security thinking, nation-building, state-making, 
inter-ethnic relations and most importantly, healing and reconciliation. 
The piecemeal policies of national reconciliation and national unity, 
which were nowhere put into writing, did not succeed in extinguishing the 
potential post-colonial conf licts. Whereas racial identities had provoked 
the liberation struggle itself, ethnic identities provoked the post-colonial 
conf lict that mainly affected Matebeleland and Midlands regions (CCJP 
and LRF 1997).
Thus, incomplete decolonisation provoked the Hondo Yeminda/Third 
Chimurenga/Jambanja (violent Fast Track Land Reform Programme that 
commenced in 2000). Ethnicity and inter-nationalist power-struggles 
provoked Operation Gukurahundi (1983–1987) that targeted Ndebele-
speaking people of Matebeleland and Midlands of Zimbabwe (Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace and Legal Resources Foundation 
Report, CCJP and LRF 1997). Post-2000, power-struggles pitting the ruling 
Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) against 
the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations 
provoked election-related violence, code-named Operation Mavhoterapapi 
(Where did you place your vote?) of 2008 (Sadomba 2011:229). 
Like all post-colonial polities, Zimbabwe is still in a stage of ‘becoming’ 
a nation-state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009, Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009) 
and this conjectural phase is often fraught with conflicts. Election times 
have rarely been peaceful in Zimbabwe since 1980.  Belonging to different 
political formations provokes hatred and violence in a country where the 
question of equitable distribution of national resources and indigenisation 
of the national economy is still in the process of being fully resolved. 
This is worsened by the persistence of historical questions of colonialism 
and coloniality which continue to hang over the minds of people like a 
nightmare (Sachikonye 1996, Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a, 2013b). As a result of 
these realities, conflict and violence have continued to be a major challenge 
in Zimbabwe (Mashingaidze 2010). 
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Ironically, there has never been any serious national commitment to 
finding the truth, establishing justice, and forging durable reconciliation in 
Zimbabwe. It is not surprising that after 35 years of existence as a sovereign 
post-colonial nation, Zimbabwe is still desperately crying out for a well-
thought-out truth, justice and reconciliation mechanism. A paradigm of 
war refuses to disappear in Zimbabwe and Chimurenga emerges as the 
prime and most preferred solution to most national questions. Zimbabwe 
has just emerged from a violent Third Chimurenga that was used to 
resolve the land question. Closely tied to the ideology of Chimurenga is 
the practice of governance through military operations. This has resulted 
in a society that is permeated institutionally by militarism and violence. 
This creates more healing and reconciliation challenges while leaving 
previous ones unresolved. 
2. Towards the reconstitution of the political in 
Zimbabwe
The quest for national healing and reconciliation is in fact a quest for the 
reconstitution of ‘the political’ and the practising of politics and statecraft. 
The political speaks to such ontological issues as values and norms that 
inform and underpin political practice (Mouffe 2005:8). Therefore, the 
central proposition of this article is that there is everything wrong with the 
conception, constitution and configuration of ‘the political’ (as a concept 
and embodiment of normative political principles) and the concomitant 
practice of politics (as an activity) in Zimbabwe. This wrong conception, 
constitution, and configuration of ‘the political’ are currently confusing 
the definition of the national question which is the guiding vehicle 
for healing and reconciliation endeavours in Zimbabwe. The national 
question is understood by the liberation forces at least in a skewed partisan 
perspective and at most as a regime-survival tactic.
The Zimbabwean problem of conf lict and violence emanates from the fact 
that ‘the political’ is still understood from a Hobbesian (1894) notion of 
a leviathan whose life is ‘short, nasty and brutish’; a Nietzschean (1968) 
idea of politics as a ‘will to power’; and a Machiavellian (1910) perspective 
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of a leader as ‘the prince’ who enjoys absolute power. The reduction of 
the purpose of ‘the political’ to that of the ‘will to power’, in particular, 
constitutes the original corruption of ‘the political’ as a totality, involving 
the distortion of its noble vocation of politics itself (Dussel 2003:8).  
To Enrique Dussel, the original and noble vocation of politics was founded 
on the ‘will to live’ and not the ‘will to power’ (2003: 4). In this original 
conception, ‘Politics is above all that action that aspires towards the 
advancement of the life of the community, of the people, of humanity’ 
(Dussel 2003:61). For Dussel (2003:78), as a result of the corruption of ‘the 
political,’ the ‘will to live’ is ‘negated by the will-to-power of the powerful’. 
But ‘politics, as consensual and feasible will-to-live’, should attempt by all 
means to allow all ‘members to live, to live well, and to increase the quality 
of their lives’ (Dussel 2003:85).
The corruption of ‘the political’ takes the following format of distortion 
if not destruction of the ethical, positive, progressive, emancipatory/
liberatory, and humanist vocation of politics. Dussel (2003:3) termed the 
process of corruption of the ‘the political’ ‘the fetishism of power’ in which 
a political leader becomes ‘the centre or source of political power’ rather 
than the political community defined as the people/citizens.  He elaborated 
on corruption of power:
This corruption, moreover, is double: it corrupts the governors who 
believe themselves to be the sovereign centre of power, and it corrupts 
the political community that allows itself (consents) to become servile 
rather than be an actor in the construction of the political (actions, 
institutions, principles) (Dussel 2003:4).
Under a corrupted ‘political’, power is simply exercised as domination. 
The consequence is that under these circumstances, people are surviving 
rather than living, and each day is about avoiding and postponing death. 
Citizens become subjects who live in a perpetual survival, self-preservation 
mode as issues of justice and reconciliation become trivialised at the 
government level. This situation arises when ‘power qua service’ (exercise 
of power in the service of the political community) has been allowed to die 
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(Dussel 2003:130). For Dussel (2003:131), when ‘the political’ is corrupted, 
power is understood as a ‘thing, an object at hand, or a well-bound package’ 
that has to be conquered, taken and then retained by all means necessary. 
In this conception of ‘the political’ and this practice of politics, the state 
exists to preserve itself by conquering and retaining power and not to heal 
and reconcile a fractured nation. This explains the Zimbabwean state’s 
lackadaisical approach to issues of healing and reconciliation.
There is therefore a need for a reconstituted political in which the central 
aspect of political practice is predicated on a ‘will to live’ rather than the 
‘will to power’. In this reconstituted political there is need for a radical 
departure from the ‘paradigm of war’ to a ‘paradigm of peace’. There is also 
need to shift drastically from traditional criminal justice in which there is a 
perpetrator and a victim to what Mamdani (2015:61–65) terms ‘survivor’s 
justice’ that is amenable to reconciliation and national healing. Survivor’s 
justice leans towards political justice that speaks to political transformation 
of a society emerging from mass violence. Otherwise, how do you achieve 
healing and reconciliation in a situation of a corrupted political, where the 
state is accused of benefitting from human rights abuse? The answer to this 
question is that what is needed is a programme for the resolution of justice 
issues that is predicated on the very reconstitution of ‘the political’ itself. 
Zimbabweans have, since the 1990s, been calling for a fundamental 
reconstitution of the political. This call has taken the form of a demand 
for a people-driven constitution. It has taken over ten years for Zimbabwe 
to have a new constitution, albeit not really a people-driven one, as the 
political gladiators hijacked the process. At least the new constitution 
that became operational in 2013 incorporates a National Peace and 
Reconciliation Commission (NPRC). Our intervention is therefore that 
the NPRC has to initiate a comprehensive process of reconstituting ‘the 
political’ that is predicated on a paradigm of war cascading from colonial 
and nationalist traditions. We also posit that the NPRC has to pursue 
justice in a manner that seeks to attain the five objectives outlined by 
Boraine (2006): accountability, truth recovery, reconciliation, institutional 
reform, and reparations. These are efficacious in both guiding the work of 
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the NPRC and also judging its performance. Suffice to state that the global 
record of such commissions has been less than satisfactory (Eppel and 
Raftopoulos 2008:12). In choosing the means through which the NPRC 
will be operationalised, it must be noted that the end must determine the 
means instead of the means determining the end. 
More specifically, Hayner, in Eppel and Raftopoulos (2008), contextualised 
the factors which contributed to the failure of commissions such as the NPRC 
since their formation. She noted that the most significant contributory factors 
are lack of consultation, inadequate preparations, setting high expectations, 
and  the lack of institutional follow up to support the processes of the 
commission. The more than two dozen truth commissions set up to date 
suffered these shortcomings in one form or the other and the NPRC needs 
to be mindful of them. Such fears are exacerbated by the poor performance 
records of Zimbabwe’s past commissions (Benyera 2014a:114). Given such 
a poor track record, it is necessary to unpack some of the key issues and 
challenges facing the justice and reconciliation question in Zimbabwe.
3. The key issues and challenges around justice and 
reconciliation in Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe is haunted by a plethora of injustices cascading from the past. 
These can be categorised into political, social and economic categories. 
A host of historical issues are central to justice and healing considerations 
for Zimbabwe. Specifically, these are: historical legacies of abuse and 
violence dating from pre-colonial times; challenges arising from incomplete 
decolonisation; the interpretation of nationalism and liberation; issues 
of inclusion and exclusion; the national question which comprises 
nation-building and state-building; inter-and intra-party tensions and 
contestations; issues of race, ethnicity and citizenship; and finally the role 
of external interference, otherwise known as ‘coloniality’ (Quijano 2000). 
Coloniality captures a situation of continuation of colonial-like practices 
of governance in a post-colonial state.
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With all these burdens still unresolved Zimbabwe inevitably became 
a politically volatile country. Political differences continued to be 
settled through the use of violence or the threat of its use, and political 
intolerance has remained the cornerstone of Zimbabwe’s political contests. 
Whatever mechanisms and methodologies employed to achieve justice and 
reconciliation must therefore be capable of engaging with the historical 
legacies of conf lict and violence, such as those pitting the Ndebele against 
the Shona in the pre-colonial era. This is pertinent because Zimbabwean 
national history remains shot through by a xenophobic narrative in 
which the descendants of pre-colonial Shona-speaking people continue to 
harbour a grievance against the descendants of the pre-colonial Ndebele-
speaking people. Ndebele raids continue to be counted as the result of a 
historic grievance. Even the Fifth Brigade atrocities were justified in some 
quarters as vengeance for what the Ndebele did in the 19th century. But such 
an approach to conf lict resolution creates unending cycles of perpetrators 
and victims, and possesses the potential to seriously hinder every effort at 
nation-building.  
The initiative towards national healing, justice and reconciliation is not 
only facing complex and multi-layered political issues but equally complex 
economic and social justice challenges that include dealing with the land 
question, ownership and indigenisation of the economy, compensation and 
reparations, social cohesion and unity, and resolving economic and social 
inequalities, perceptions and realities of marginalisation of minorities, 
patriarchy and gender. These are intersected and combined in a paradoxical 
manner with past legacies of conf lict and violence. This then means that if 
the NPRC has to deal effectively and honestly with these issues, it has to take 
into account colonial realities of brutality, dispossession and exploitation 
that go as far back as the 1890s. As a conf lict resolution mechanism the 
Lancaster House Settlement was not honest and suffered the lack of honest 
brokers (Novak 2009:149–174). For example, Lord Carrington acted as a 
third party negotiator who steered unborn Zimbabwe into a neo-colony 
rather than a sovereign post-colonial nation-state. 
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Consequently, incomplete decolonisation has continued to haunt 
Zimbabwe – as in the case of the land question that has once again put the 
Zimbabwe question on the global map. The brokers of peace who supported 
maintenance of unequal ownership of land set Zimbabwe on a course for 
another conf lict. It can for instance be argued that the unresolved land 
ownership also originated from the manner in which the Lancaster House 
negotiations were conducted by Carrington – ‘with a fast-paced tempo, 
hard deadlines, and strict ultimatums’ (Novak 2009:151). In that way 
Carrington managed to deal with the three contentious issues of securing a 
ceasefire, setting a transitional administration to see the country through 
the ceasefire period and the all-race elections, and a new constitution for 
independent Zimbabwe in such a way that the land question was postponed 
as a problem to be resolved by the administration of Zimbabwe.
The legacy of nationalism and liberation struggle has not been positive 
for Zimbabwe. Notions of monolithic unity enforced from above were 
bequeathed on post-colonial Zimbabwe, and so was intolerance of dissent 
and adherence to a personality cult (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003:99–134). 
The dominant political cultures during this nationalist period were 
‘authoritarianism, commandism, regimentalism and intolerance’ 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012:3). These violent liberation cultures continue 
to haunt the country and were aptly captured by the historian Terence 
Ranger (2003:1–2) who postulated that:
Perhaps post-independence authoritarianism was the result of 
liberation wars themselves, when disagreements could mean death. 
It was difficult to escape the legacy of such a war. Maybe it sprang 
from the adoption by so many nationalists and especially liberation 
movements, of Marxist-Leninist ideologies. These implied ‘democratic 
centralism,’ the domination of civil society by the state and top-down 
modernising ‘development.’ But perhaps there was something inherent 
in nationalism itself, even before the wars and adoption of socialism, 
which gave rise to authoritarianism. Maybe nationalism’s emphasis 
on unity at all costs—its subordination of trade unions and churches 
and all other African organisations to its imperatives—gave rise to 
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an intolerance of pluralism. Maybe nationalism’s glorification of the 
leader gave rise to postcolonial personality cults. Maybe nationalism’s 
commitment to modernisation, whether sociality or not, inevitably 
implied a ‘commandist’ state.  
Such an analysis beckons us to ref lect on the sources of disdain for 
constitutionalism, failure to strictly adhere to the principles of separation 
of powers, and intolerance of freedom of expression. This is clear evidence 
that there is need for investment in understanding the very constitution 
of ‘the political’ as well as the complex legacies of the past and how 
they impinge on the current realities of healing and reconciliation in 
Zimbabwe. Without such an understanding, any efforts in dealing with the 
current problems of governance, injustice, violence and impunity might 
be focused on symptoms rather than substantive causalities. So far, the 
mechanisms adopted towards resolution of conf lict in Zimbabwe have 
not only been minimal, but they also lack the active backing of the state 
which instituted them.
4. Contending perspectives on justice and reconciliation
Three mechanisms were used by the state between 1979 and 2014 to address 
the justice and reconciliation question in Zimbabwe. These three were: 
amnesties and pardons, amnesia, and commissions of inquiry. 
Amnesties and pardons
Just before the dawn of independence in 1979, the colonial state embarked 
on a legal project predominantly aimed at protecting its forces from post-
political independence prosecution. This was in the form of the General 
Amnesty Ordinance 3 of 1979, which heralded the beginning of amnesties 
and pardons that were to characterise the end of each epoch of state-
sponsored violence in Zimbabwe. Stated simply, these amnesties and 
ordinances gave unfettered immunity from prosecution and accountability 
to all those accused of gross violation of human rights, such as the 
genocide of 1983–1987 known as Operation Gukurahundi. Other pardons 
and amnesties include: Amnesty (General Pardon) Ordinance 12 of 1980, 
Clemency Order No. 1 of 18 April 1988 (General Notice 257A of 1988), 
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Clemency Order Number 1 of 2000 (General Notice 457A), Clemency 
Order No. 1 of 2008, (General Notice 85A of 2008) and Clemency Order 
Number 1 of 2002. 
These amnesties gave blanket immunity thereby stifling the processes of 
truth telling, truth recovery, healing and reconciliation. The capacity of the 
NPRC to remedy these historical shortcomings remains to be seen. However, 
based on its current trajectory, the Commission will operate as an instrument 
to hide the truth and obstruct accountability. This observation is based on 
the state’s track record at healing and reconciliation which, besides being 
littered with amnesties and pardons, is heavily punctuated with an amnesia 
that has become its official position regarding past human rights abuses. 
The National Reconciliation Policy of 1980 and the Unity Accord of 1987 are 
the cornerstones of this amnesia policy (Mungwini 2013).
Amnesia
Amnesia is a policy which entails a conscious decision by the government 
not to investigate past atrocities on the grounds that such investigations 
will jeopardise precarious peacebuilding efforts (Tendi 2010:2018). 
Amnesia informed Zimbabwe’s first reconciliation policy as espoused by 
Mugabe in his independence acceptance speech as the country’s first Prime 
Minister. In the speech Mugabe implored Zimbabweans to ‘let bygones be 
bygones’ (Nyarota 2006:145). This speech, it can be argued, was the event 
which marked the death of statist justice and reconciliation mechanisms 
in Zimbabwe. 
Commissions of Inquiry
Commissions of Inquiry also featured prominently in Zimbabwe’s 
justice and healing landscape. Two commissions of inquiry, namely the 
Dumbutshena Commission of Inquiry of 1982 and the Chihambakwe 
Commission of Inquiry of 1983, had led to high hopes, but the state refused 
to make public their findings. This amounted to secondary victimisation, 
especially to the victims and perpetrators who had given their testimonies 
to the two commissions. 
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The latest in this series of commissions was the Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Commission of 2009. The Commission was simply a still birth as it never 
even had offices or staff. Then came the short-lived Organ on National 
Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (the Organ) of 2008 which was part 
of the two-year Government of National Unity (GNU). The Organ never 
achieved much given the toxic political environment in which it operated. 
Machakanja (2010:5) concurs and noted how continued impunity during 
the tenure of the GNU undermined the concept of an inclusive power 
sharing founded on the principles of social cohesion, national healing 
and unity. The Organ is the predecessor of the NPRC which is being 
headed by Vice-President Phelekezela Mphoko. These initiatives were not 
without their challenges, some of which will be brief ly discussed in the 
following section. 
5. Shortcomings of reconciliation and healing 
mechanisms used in Zimbabwe 
The biggest challenge which faced statist justice and healing initiatives from 
Zimbabwe since 1980 was premised upon what Jonathan Moyo referred to 
as implementesis.1 This is the lack of political will to implement government 
decisions. As a political disease, implementesis paralyses state departments, 
rendering them incapable of following clearly articulated government 
policies – such as the operationalisation of the Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Commission. Wyn Reilly (1987:27) calls it the ‘hombe thesis’ which is 
the ability of the bureaucracy to effectively mismanage state projects and 
policies so that they benefit from the mismanagement. 
Perennial polarisation of the political climate in Zimbabwe only aided 
the failure of statist healing and reconciliation initiatives. A political 
environment in which partisanship overrides national interest is not 
conducive for healing and reconciliation, especially when the country is 
1 Jonathan Moyo coined the term implementesis in his public lecture delivered at the 
Department of Political Sciences, the University of Zimbabwe, in October 2008. In the 
lecture, Moyo identified the failure by the bureaucracy as one of the seven contributing 
factors to the failure of public administration in Zimbabwe. 
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characterised by selectivity in the application of domestic and international 
law. Probably one of the biggest challenges which faced statist healing and 
justice mechanisms in Zimbabwe was the conundrum of using the state 
organs to prosecute the state, which is itself believed to be a perpetrator 
of gross violations of human rights. This explains the state’s perennial 
proclivity towards amnesia, which, when ‘reconstituting the political’, 
will make it essential to have an all-stakeholder concerted effort to achieve 
healing and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. 
6. The roles of the various domestic actors
Now that the NPRC is constitutionally provided for, certain stakeholders 
are expected to play a major role in its functions. The government has the 
biggest role to play, which is largely to create an enabling environment 
for justice and reconciliation. Specifically, the government of Zimbabwe 
must consider:
1)	 Speeding up the setting up of the NPRC.
2)	 Enacting legislation enabling the NPRC to commence its mandate.
3)	 Providing the necessary budgetary and policy support needed by 
the NPRC.
4)	 Publishing the reports by the various former commissions of 
inquiry and where applicable, implementing recommendations 
made in those reports.
5)	 Initiating and promoting state institution reform as a means 
of enhancing the public’s confidence and trust in such state 
institutions. This will simultaneously enhance their capacity 
to deliver and to promote political dialogue, national healing 
and reconciliation.
6)	 Ensuring a true and consistent national narrative on healing 
and reconciliation.
An impartial judiciary is an integral part of any justice process. In order 
to fulfil that mandate effectively, the executive needs to improve its respect 
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for the judiciary. This will in turn enhance the credibility of the judiciary 
which has been perceived as a perpetual soft target for the executive. 
The Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights concurred and were quoted by 
Goredema (2010:99) arguing that 
in Zimbabwe we have had the executive refusing to enforce certain court 
orders that are seen to be unfavourable to the state or the ruling ZANU 
PF party. The executive has also attacked the judiciary openly, quite 
unprofessionally and unfairly in a number of cases. The government of 
Zimbabwe however has a history of attacking the judiciary or members 
of the legal profession each time the executive is unhappy at certain 
judiciary decisions.
At a lower level there is need for the judiciary to ensure that the rulings 
of traditional courts, especially village heads, are given credence. 
This will ensure that justice is literally brought to the doorsteps of the 
people, particularly those in rural areas. Political parties have the great 
responsibility of mobilising their members away from violence, revenge, 
hatred – and towards reconciliation. A great step in this direction would 
be to have a clause in each of the political parties’ manifestos that deals 
with peacebuilding and reconciliation. A key lesson coming from South 
Africa is the need for political will in the implementation of any justice 
and reconciliation mechanism. In demonstrating political will and 
leadership, Nelson Mandela, as leader of the African National Congress 
(ANC), accepted collective responsibility for all human rights violations 
committed by ANC members in their attempt to end apartheid (Castel 
2009). This made it easy for lower level political party members to deal 
with their past heinous activities. This can be contrasted to ZANU-PF’s 
position in 1980, when its leader Robert Mugabe announced a policy of 
blanket reconciliation (Benyera 2014a:39)
Women should do more than just bring out their testimonies. They need 
to be actively involved in whatever reconciliation and healing initiatives 
are instituted so as to ensure that the perennial issues of patriarchy and 
gender are not ignored. Women bring to the fore gender-based violence 
25
Resolving the justice and reconciliation question in Zimbabwe
and abuses that cannot be ignored in any sustainable framework of justice 
and reconciliation, bearing in mind that women are often the most abused 
population in any form of conf lict (Human Rights Watch 1996, Turshen 
2001:55–68). 
The role of civil society is to complement the efforts of the state. This could 
take various forms, such as raising awareness, disseminating information, 
establishing education programmes around the work of the Commission, 
producing and distributing publicity materials, funding debates and 
outreach campaigns, translating key materials such as constitutions and 
Commission mandates, and funding radio and television programmes and 
advertisements that focus on publicising the work of the Commission. 
In South Africa, the media was an integral part of the work of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), broadcasting the location of 
future hearing venues and raising public awareness (Shea 2000:4). 
The media also facilitated the live broadcast of the hearings, thereby 
helping to bring the work of the TRC to the nation (Cole 2010). 
This generated public interest, enhanced participation and, it can be argued, 
played a part in bringing reconciliation to South Africa. Civil society and 
the international community could assist the NPRC in the production and 
distribution of its outputs on an on-going basis. These outputs could be 
monthly or annual reports of the NPRC, the dissemination of which would 
act as integral components of the peacebuilding process. Given the lack of 
financial resources of the Zimbabwean state, funding from the international 
community is essential to ensure the success of this programme. 
Non-Governmental Organisations working on healing and reconciliation in 
Zimbabwe can support the process with the provision of technical support, 
expertise and even personnel in support areas such as communication, 
logistics, advertising and data analysis. Their visibility and participation 
in various ways will have the ability to bring international credibility to 
the whole process, as was the case in South Africa. The role of business 
would be expected to be mainly that of partnering with the government 
in various ways such as, but not limited to, the assistance with resources. 
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As a case in point, businesses in the Telecommunications sector can assist 
with publicity and information dissemination. 
Faith-based organisations, especially churches, have been an integral part 
of most truth commissions. They provided truth commissions with the 
moral ground from which they operated. By authenticating the work of 
the truth commission, faith-based organisations, in a way, encourage their 
members to support such institutions. At a more practical level, they can 
assist with logistical issues such as venues, personnel, counsellors and 
even financial resources. Their ability to reach large numbers of people 
on a frequent basis can be used by the NPRC as a publicity platform for 
their work. 
Concepts used in justice and reconciliation such as confession and 
forgiveness also have their basis in religion and faith. Thus a symbiotic 
relationship between faith-based organisations and the NPRC becomes 
a sine qua non for the effective delivery of justice and reconciliation in 
Zimbabwe (Benyera 2014a:4). For strategic buy-in, the NPRC needs to 
liaise with organisations that represent various faith-based organisations in 
Zimbabwe such as the Zimbabwe National Traditional Healers Association, 
Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference, Union for the Development 
of Apostolic Churches in Zimbabwe and Africa, Zimbabwe Christian 
Alliance, Zimbabwe Jewish Board of Deputies, Evangelical Fellowship of 
Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Council of Islamic Scholars (Chitando and 
Manyonganise 2011:78). 
On a broader level, faith-based organisations are expected to initiate 
grassroots-based local justice and reconciliation mechanisms that 
complement the work of the NPRC. These organisations were involved 
in the quest for healing and reconciliation as noted by Chitando and 
Manyonganise (2011:83): 
[O]ne would be forgiven for imagining that it was only individuals and 
groups aligned to Christianity that have sought to empower their members 
to face the difficult situation. Muslim leaders have been heavily involved 
in preparing their followers to be relevant to the Zimbabwe crisis.
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By its very nature the NPRC is a temporary mechanism, hence the need 
for permanent grassroots-based structures such as the church to partner 
the NPRC in reconciliation. Traditional leaders play a central role in 
Zimbabwe’s customary law (Machakanja 2010:8). Their function will be 
to create those cultural spaces needed for the facilitation of the victim-
perpetrator acknowledgement. For Machakanja, traditional leaders are 
also efficacious in validating the losses and pain of both the perpetrator 
and the victims. They also initiate local grassroots mechanisms such as the 
use of customary courts to prosecute lower level offenders. At a spiritual 
level, they are expected to lead their various constituencies in performing 
certain rites, rituals and ceremonies to cleanse the land (Benyera 2014b:53). 
Their support serves to authenticate the NPRC. 
To date, various community-based institutions and organisations have 
worked on attaining healing and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. While most 
of these were faith-based (Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Baha’i 
and Rastafarianism) (Chitando and Manyonganise 2010:78), some of these 
organisations such as the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and Heal 
Zimbabwe are purely civic organisations. Some of these organisations have 
been working on healing and reconciliation, hence the need for the NPRC 
to tap into their work. These NGO and civic organisations can contribute 
to the work of the NPRC by:
1)	 Continuing the work of seeking healing and reconciliation at 
local level
2)	 Considering expanding their operations to other areas
3)	 Sharing their experiences with like-minded organisations
4)	 Identifying and pursuing in courts of law cases where victims 
are entitled to reparations.
7. Resource constraints
For the NPRC to achieve its aims of reconciliation and establishment of 
the truth, full funding should be committed and available at the start of 
its work. Lack of funding was experienced in Uganda, where the first Truth 
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Commission was established in Africa (Quinn 2004:89). The Ugandan 
Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights between 1962 and 
1986 suffered from a severe lack of funding and political support, which 
resulted in irreparable operational difficulties (Freeman 2006:40). 
While the lack of sufficient funds is a worrying factor for Zimbabwe’s 
healing and reconciliation process, other concerns also exist, such as weak 
governance systems and structures. According to the International Anti-
Corruption Index, as far back as 1999 Zimbabwe had the second weakest 
governance structures in SADC, after war-torn DRC. These results were 
consistent with similar ones from Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2013), and the Heritage 
Foundation Index on Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation 2014).
Regarding the funding of reparations, lessons from South Africa indicate 
a need to empower the Commission to offer urgent, smaller, interim 
standard payments to victims or their families (South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission 1996: Volume 1, chapters 2 and 6, and 
Volume 6). However, research by the Catholic Commission for Justice and 
Peace (CCJP and LRF 1997:29) in Matabeleland revealed that individual 
compensation was not well supported by victims there or in parts of the 
Midlands Provinces. A key recommendation from the research was the use 
of communal reparations, specifically through the formation of Uxolelwano 
(reconciliation) Trusts in lieu of individual financial reparations. 
However, such a move needs to be well managed, as similar previous 
well-meaning endeavours were looted by the politically well connected. 
Earlier compensatory schemes which offered cash, such as the War Victims 
Compensation Scheme of 1998, were severely plundered with some 
beneficiaries falsifying injuries and creating fictitious stories just to receive 
compensation (Carver 2000). The award of individual financial reparations 
must therefore be considered both in the light of the distortions that such 
monetary compensation attracts as well as victim’s rights to compensation 
of their choice. 
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This being the case, the fact that Zimbabwe was at one point bankrupt 
should not impede its quest for an NPRC, as there are many examples 
of Truth Commissions that received external funding. For example, 
El Salvador's Commission was fully funded (to the tune of $2.5 million) 
through voluntary contributions by UN members (Shea 2000:64, Kritz 
1995:332, Hayner 2011:217). The South African TRC also received financial 
support from international donors who supplemented the money provided 
by the South African government (Hayner 2011:224). However, given that 
the NPRC will have a 10-year mandate, funds and resources may become a 
major stumbling block to its operations. This was the case with other well-
funded mechanisms such as the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR).
8. Conclusion
The constitution of ‘the political’ speaks to the values underpinning 
political practices. In a reconstituted political, the role of the government 
must be to create an enabling environment for healing and reconciliation 
to occur. But for Zimbabwe, the challenge to the proposed reconstitution of 
‘the political’ is that the very government which is supposed to champion 
national reconciliation and healing is accused of benefitting from human 
rights abuses. This challenge, therefore, gives credence to those voices that 
clamour for regime change as an essential prerequisite for genuine national 
healing and reconciliation. 
This article highlights the importance of engaging with the past and dealing 
with the legacies of the past because these seem directly to impinge on the 
current efforts to re-build the nation through a justice and reconciliation 
mechanism. This approach does not mean that a simple acknowledgement 
of wrongs of the past can be the only enabling factor in opening new 
paradigms predicated on peace, truth, justice and reconciliation. It means 
that the edifice of ‘the political’ must be reconstituted in a manner that 
renders it sensitive to national healing and reconciliation.  This is important 
because there are many wrongs which are crying out for rectification. 
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The people of Zimbabwe must be involved in defining and articulating the 
wrongs that haunt their nation and their lives. They must participate in 
the reconstitution of ‘the political’. The article also underscores that while 
national memorialisation programmes are a valid national rallying point, 
family and community memorialisation programmes are more effective in 
bringing healing and closure (Eppel 2013). The article therefore emphasises 
the imperative of involving communities and families in deciding how they 
would want to remember their past. The erection of monuments is one 
popular method used in post-genocide Rwanda and it can be applied to the 
victims of gross violations of human rights in Zimbabwe such as Operation 
Gukurahundi of the 1980s.
Unfortunately, Zimbabwe’s NPRC is a top-down mechanism which is 
yet to open up for communities and families to participate in the search 
for national healing and reconciliation. In a country like Zimbabwe, 
where community input is either disregarded or not solicited at all, the 
NPRC faces a huge challenge in selling itself to the people so that they 
come forward with their testimonies. The polarisation of the political 
environment does not make the task any easier. Traditional authorities and 
civil society organisations such as faith-based organisations present a more 
credible mechanism which the state can utilise to get wide community buy 
in. As for those in the Diaspora, there is a need to come up with inclusive 
mechanisms for them to also participate in this programme. 
Broadly speaking, this article concludes that it is also important to re-think 
the very political edifice on which Zimbabwe is erected – that privileges 
Chimurenga as a paradigm of war used to resolve complex political 
questions. It seems impossible in Zimbabwe at the moment to institute 
Nuremburg-type trials predicated on criminal justice because the state 
itself is the main culprit that has abused and killed its own citizens. A way 
out is to adopt a new ‘survivor’s justice’ that privileges the political reform 
of society (reconstitution of the political). We therefore end by saying that 
there is no ideal time for a justice and reconciliation mechanism to get 
underway. Choosing a time is part of the struggle to break a ‘paradigm of 
war’, build a ‘paradigm of peace’ and make a start.     
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